

~~SECRET~~

Executive Registry

79-1779

3 August 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with the Secretary of State,
2 August 1979 (U)

1. The Secretary at the beginning and again at the end of our conversation thanked me very deeply and sincerely for the superb way in which we handled the verification issue. He believes we have defused that in a very effective manner and he felt that we played our role here most professionally. Please pass this to [REDACTED] and company. (C)

2. When I first arrived, Vaky and Bowdler were on hand. There was a great deal of unhappiness over a piece of paper they had in their hands which was the text of what we presented to the Congress on the [REDACTED]. In effect they felt that they had been taken by surprise and were not ready to agree with all of the specific actions we were contemplating under the finding. They therefore felt that we were putting on a poor show for the Congress to not have our act together.

a. In addition, Bowdler in particular felt that he had some ideas for [REDACTED] which were worthy of our consideration and had not been tapped in this process.

b. Secretary Vance's concern was that we coordinate our efforts more. The Secretary directed Bowdler and Vaky to come up with a paper on how we should do this. (S)

3. I expressed my opinion that the paper we took to the Congress to explain [REDACTED] was in essence a paper which we sent to the SCC and, therefore, pointed out that they had seen that paper well in advance of any presentations to the Congress. There was a complaint, however, that in this particular instance the paper presenting the proposed finding did not get circulated by the NSC to the SCC members in advance of the meeting. I further indicated that we were always anxious to gain their views on how we could do covert action

ORIGINAL CL BY 169947

☐ DECLX ☐ REVW ON 3 August 1985~~SECRET~~

REASON

SECRET

better but that I didn't think it was necessarily a good idea to develop the covert action proposal jointly. The SCC process provided an opportunity for State and others to make an input. The Perspective process gave State an opportunity afterwards to sign off on specific actions that would flow from the covert action proposal.

(There was one point of confusion in my mind. I have created the distinction between general and specific findings. Yet, I'm not sure in this instance whether we are in fact very clear. If we counted [REDACTED], the actual finding is fairly general. The specific sub-items that we are going to accomplish were listed in the paper that went forward with the finding but it really doesn't give the State Department the same opportunity as with a Perspective.) (S)

25X

4. I think what has happened is two things. First, we have a new phenomenon in the Congress wanting to get an explanation of why we're going to do covert actions rather than just that we are going to do them. Second, these covert actions are much more true political actions than most of the things we have been doing over the past several years and hence the State Department is getting more sensitive about them. We've got to tread a fine line between staying in tune with the State Department's policies and yet not letting ourselves get tied hand and foot by talking to State every time we make an operational decision on a covert action. [REDACTED]

25X1C

5. The Secretary then raised the issue of whether we should, in fact, support [REDACTED] Vaky, Bowdler and Vance all obviously have strong reservations about [REDACTED] due to his reputation for corruption. They also believe he will not be effective in creating an alternative political structure. I pointed out that we were going to use him, I thought, primarily to keep an alternative base available and to keep some pressure on [REDACTED] through having an opposition that would be demanding elections, etc. I also pointed out that what they were suggesting was really reversing the SCC's decision. While there is nothing to prevent the SCC reversing itself, I didn't think CIA and State could or should do that. We agreed that Bowdler would discuss this with us during the meeting on 3 August in addition [REDACTED] if a change is desirable, we will go back through the SCC. (S)

25X

6. We had considerable discussion on the latest MX proposal and I'm to hear it tomorrow. It's going to be critically important that we develop our position on whether or not the US proposal is verifiable. (C)

7. The Secretary recommended I get together with Phil Habib after he comes back from his trip to the Caribbean. The Secretary is very pleased with the initial papers Habib has developed on this. (C)

SECRET

SECRET

8. The Secretary asked that we be very alert to anything coming out of Lusaka during the Commonwealth Conference. He would like to get as straight a read-out on that as he can since there will be many different colorations to the official reports. (C)

9. The Secretary also asked for our appraisal of what the Nigerians are up to. (C)

10. We ran out of time. I delivered the blue bags. I didn't get to any of the other items. (U)

5X1C 11. Leave the [REDACTED] issue on the agenda, and put it on the agenda for Brzezinski on 3 August. (C)

12. Drop the overflight issue. Drop the Backfire production issue. (C)

5X1C 13. [REDACTED]. (C)

14. I didn't deliver the special memo for Brown on instability in El Salvador because we were handing out the IIM on Central America at the PRC later in the afternoon. So drop that one. (C)

15. Keep the 1962 US-Soviet Understanding issue. (C).

16. Take items J through Q and screen them down to see if any are still applicable next time I get on the Secretary of State's calendar. There were too many in this case; I couldn't possibly have covered them all. I want two or three or four items for future meetings if we have that many that seem important. (U)

17. I don't know that I want to raise the FBI report. Let me have recommendations. (C)

[REDACTED]
STANSFIELD TURNER
Director
[REDACTED]
b7

25X

25X

SECRET

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT (O/DCI) Routing Slip

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	DD/RM				
4	DD/NFA	1,8,9	6,7		
5	DD/CT				
6	DD/A				
7	DD/O	2,3,4,5	7,8,9		
8	DD/S&T				
9	GC				
10	LC		2,3,4		
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/PA				
14	D/EE0				
15	D/Pers				
16	AO/DCI				
17	C/IPS				
18	NSC/C	X			
19	C/SALT/SS		1		
20	NIO/SP		1,6		
21	ES		X		
22					

SUSPENSE DATE:

Remarks: Paragraphs indicated above were extracted for action or info as appropriate.

AGENDA
for
2 August 1979 Meeting with Secretary Vance

Following your Memorandum for the Record of the last (19 July) meeting are tabs with topics for today's meeting.

25X1C

<u>TAB</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>	
A covered	General Items. - ALSO SENSITIVE OSO OP [REDACTED]	
B not covered	[REDACTED]	25X1C
C not covered (drop)	Overflight Issue, Advise re HPSCI action on U-2R reprogramming request.	
D not covered (drop)	Backfire Production--You may want to brief on recent evidence supporting our estimates of rate of production.	
E not covered (drop)	[REDACTED]	
F not covered (drop)	"Threats to Government Stability" [REDACTED] Deliver copy of NFAC memo (done in response to questions raised by SecDef 25 July).	25X1C
G covered	DDO Special Item. -- [REDACTED] has special folder.	
H covered	Deliver "blue bags" ([REDACTED] has).	25X1C 25X1C
I not covered	1962 US-Soviet Understanding--A Record? [REDACTED] memo)	
J not covered (drop)	Sharing of Information on Morocco.	
K	Tidbits: Extracts from Africa Warning Memo.	
L	Tidbits: Extracts from China Warning Memo.	
M	Tidbits: Extracts from USSR-EE Warning Memo.	
N	Tidbits: Extracts from Latin America Warning Memo.	
O	Tidbits: Extracts from Near East/South Asia Warning Memo.	
P	Tidbits: Extracts from East Asia/Pacific Warning Memo.	
Q	Tidbits: Extracts from Western Europe Warning Memo.	
R	FBI Report on KGB Use of US Soviet Emigre Community	

Additional items covered (see Mem. Rec.): [REDACTED] (varied by [REDACTED])
• MX Briefing PRC
• Lusaka Commonwealth Conf.
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP81B00401R002300300001-6
SECRET

SECRET

TAB A


General Items

- "Thanks" to Vance for
 - His support (memo to President) re OMB Guidance.
 - Christopher's comments/support at PRC(I).
- How far with Thatcher go in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia?
 - Vance's reaction to somewhat surprising emergence of Franz-Josef Strauss as opposition Chancellor-candidate in FRG (Strauss may visit Washington in October).
- ✕ Cyprus: communal talks in recess. Where does Vance see us going from here.
 - Vance impressions of interplay among Thatcher, Giscard, Schmidt at Tokyo Summit--any intimation of a "European front?"
- ✕ Anything from Bowie's Presidential brief on Turkey yesterday?
 - SALT Testimony (next three tabs have SALT-related items).

Egypt

SECRET

SPECIAL OPERATIONS



25X1C

Deliver Blue Bags